The Iraq War has been the subject of heated
political debate and intense academic scrutiny. Much
argument has focused on the decision to invade and
the size of the force tasked with the campaign. While
these factors have contributed to the challenge of
counterinsurgency operations, so has the American
approach to unconventional war.
Taking full account of the factors beyond the control
of the U.S. military and avoiding glib comparisons
with Vietnam, this monograph examines how the
American approach has affected operations. The
author, Dr. Thomas Mockaitis, draws on the experience
of other nations, particularly the United Kingdom, to
identify broad lessons that might inform the conduct
of this and future campaigns. He also documents the
process by which soldiers and Marines in Iraq have
adapted to the challenging situation and incorporated
both historic and contemporary lessons into the new
counterinsurgency doctrine contained in Field Manual
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