Intentionality is one of the central problems of modern philosophy. How can a thought, action or belief be about something? Sachs draws on the work of Wilfrid Sellars, C I Lewis and Maurice Merleau-Ponty to build a new theory of intentionality that solves many of the problems faced by traditional conceptions.

Acknowledgments; Introduction: Why A New Account of Intentionality?; Chapter 1 Intentionality and the Problem of Transcendental Friction; Chapter 2 The Epistemic Given and the Semantic Given in C. I. Lewis; Chapter 3 Discursive Intentionality and 'Nonconceptual Content' in Sellars; Chapter 4 The Retreat from Nonconceptualism: Discourse and Experience in Brandom and McDowell; Chapter 5 Somatic Intentionality and Habitual Normativity in Merleau-Ponty's Account of Lived Embodiment; Chapter 6 The Possibilities and Problems of Bifurcated Intentionality; Conclusion;