Bültmann & Gerriets
Economic Interdependence and War
von Dale C. Copeland
Verlag: Princeton University Press
Reihe: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics
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ISBN: 978-1-4008-5270-3
Erschienen am 02.11.2014
Sprache: Englisch
Umfang: 504 Seiten

Preis: 35,49 €

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Inhaltsverzeichnis
Klappentext
Biografische Anmerkung

Preface vii
Abbreviations xi
Introduction 1
Chapter Oone: Theory of Economic Interdependence and War 16
Chapter Two: Quantitative Analysis and Qualitative Case Study Research 51
Chapter Three: The Russo-Japanese War and the German Wars for Hegemony, 1890-1939 97
Chapter Four: The Prelude to Pearl Harbor: Japanese Security and the Northern Question, 1905-40 144
Chapter Five: The Russian Problem and the Onset of the Pacific War, March-December 1941 184
Chapter Six: The Origins, Dynamics, and Termination of the Cold War, 1942-91 247
Chapter Seven: European Great Power Politics, 1790-1854 319
Chapter Eight: Great Power Politics in the Age of Imperial Expansion, 1856-99 375
Chapter Nine: Implications of the Argument 428
Bibliography 447
Index 473



Does growing economic interdependence among great powers increase or decrease the chance of conflict and war? Liberals argue that the benefits of trade give states an incentive to stay peaceful. Realists contend that trade compels states to struggle for vital raw materials and markets. Moving beyond the stale liberal-realist debate, Economic Interdependence and War lays out a dynamic theory of expectations that shows under what specific conditions interstate commerce will reduce or heighten the risk of conflict between nations.
Taking a broad look at cases spanning two centuries, from the Napoleonic and Crimean wars to the more recent Cold War crises, Dale Copeland demonstrates that when leaders have positive expectations of the future trade environment, they want to remain at peace in order to secure the economic benefits that enhance long-term power. When, however, these expectations turn negative, leaders are likely to fear a loss of access to raw materials and markets, giving them more incentive to initiate crises to protect their commercial interests. The theory of trade expectations holds important implications for the understanding of Sino-American relations since 1985 and for the direction these relations will likely take over the next two decades.
Economic Interdependence and War offers sweeping new insights into historical and contemporary global politics and the actual nature of democratic versus economic peace.



Dale C. Copeland is an associate professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia. He is the author of The Origins of Major War.


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