Shaun Gallagher, PhD, Hon DPhil., is the Lillian and Morrie Moss Professor of Excellence in Philosophy at the University of Memphis, and Professorial Fellow at the University of Wollongong. He has held Honorary Professorships at Copenhagen, Durham, and Tromsø, visiting positions at Cambridge, Lyon, Paris, Berlin, Oxford and Rome and was Humboldt Foundation Anneliese Maier Research Fellow (2012-18).

1 What Is Phenomenology?.

1.1 Phenomenologies.

1.2 Historical Background and Foreground.

1.3 Death and Reincarnation.

1.4 A Different Phenomenology.

1.5 Further Reading.

References.

2 Naturalism, Transcendentalism, and a New Naturalizing.

2.1 Mathematics and Psychology.

2.2 Naturalistic and Transcendental Accounts.

2.3 The Lifeworld.

2.4 Turning the Tables.

2.5 The New Naturalism.

2.6 Further Reading.

References.

3 Phenomenological Methods and some Retooling.

3.1 The Natural Attitude.

3.2 The epoché.

3.3 The Phenomenological Reductions.

3.4 Some Natural Ways of Using Phenomenology.

3.4.1 Formalizing Phenomenology.

3.4.2 Neurophenomenology.

3.4.3 Front-Loaded Phenomenology.

3.4.4 A Note on Microphenomenology.

3.4.5 Summary.

3.5 Retooling the Eidetic Reduction.

3.6 Further Reading.

References.

4 Intentionalities.

4.1 Husserl's Theory of Intentionality.

4.2 Noesis: Noema.

4.3 Neo-Pragmatic Conceptions of Intentionality.

4.4 Enactive Intentionality.

4.5 Further Reading.

References.

5 Embodiment and the Hyletic Dimension.

5.1 Hyle: A Sensational Concept.

5.2 The Critique of Husserl's Theory.

5.3 Hyle and Quale.

5.4 Embodiment and Hyletic Experience.

5.5 Deepening the Enactive Interpretation.

5.6 Further Reading.

References.

6 Time and Time Again.

6.1 Experiencing Time.

6.2 Husserl's Analysis.

6.3 The Ubiquity of Temporality.

6.4 A Dynamical Interpretation.

6.5 The Intrinsic Temporality of Action.

6.6 One More Time: Primal Impression and Enactive Structure.

6.7 Further Reading.

References.

7 Self and First-Person Perspective.

7.1 A Tradition of Disagreements.

7.2 Prereflective and Minimal Aspects of Self.

7.3 The Sense of Ownership.

7.4 IEM.

7.4.1 Schizophrenia.

7.4.2 Somatoparaphrenia.

7.4.3 Experimental Challenges to IEM.

7.4.4 The NASA Robot Experience.

7.5 The L-Theory of IEM and First-Person Perspective.

7.6 One Final Challenge: Seeing Without an I.

7.7 Further Reading.

References.

8 Action, Performance, and Narrative.

8.1 Action and Agency.

8.2 A Phenomenology of Performance.

8.3 Mindful Performance.

8.4 An Enhanced Meshed Architecture.

8.5 Action and Narrative.

8.6 Further Reading.

References.

9 Intersubjectivity and Second-Person Perspective.

9.1 Transcendental Intersubjectivity.

9.2 Being-With Others.

9.3 Standard Views of Social Cognition.

9.4 Phenomenological Approaches to Social Cognition.

9.4.1 Developmental Studies.

9.4.2 Behavioral and Phenomenological Evidence.

9.4.3 Evidence from Dynamic Systems Modeling. 9.5 The Narrative Scale in Social Cognition.

9.6 Revisiting Transcendental Intersubjectivity.

9.7 Further Reading.

References.

10 Critical Phenomenology.

10.1 Social and Political Phenomenologies.

10.2 What Is Critical Phenomenology?.

10.3 Fanon on the Phenomenology of the Historico-Racial Body Schema.

10.4 Throwing like a Phenomenologist.

10.5 The Phenomenology of Incarceration.

10.6 Critiques of Critical Phenomenology.

10.7 Further Reading.

References.