Members of the ¿animal welfare science community¿, which includes both scientists and philosophers, have illegitimately appropriated the concept of animal welfare by claiming to have given a scientific account of it that is more objectively valid than the more ¿sentimental¿ account given by animal liberationists. This strategy has been used to argue for merely limited reform in the use of animals. This strategy was initially employed as a way of ¿sympathetically¿ responding to the abolitionist claims of anti-vivisectionists, who objected to the use of animals in research. It was subsequently used by farm animal scientists.
The primarily reformist (as opposed to abolitionist) goals of this community make the false assumption that there are conditions under which animals may be raised and slaughtered for food or used as models in scientific research that are ethically acceptable. The tendency of the animal welfare science community is to accept this assumption as their framework of inquiry, and thus to discount certain practices as harmful to the interests of the animals that they affect. For example, animal welfare is conceptualized is such a way that death does not count as harmful to the interests of animal, nor prolonged life a benefit.

Preface
Introduction
PART I. The Science of Laboratory Animal Care and Welfare
Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 2. The Roots for the Emerging Science of Laboratory Animal Welfare in Great Britain
Chapter 3. The Historical Roots of the Science of Laboratory Animal Welfare in the US
Chapter 4. Laboratory Animal Welfare Issue in the US. Legislative and Regulatory History
Chapter 5. Mandated Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees
Chapter 6. Do Regulators of Animal Welfare Need to Develop a Theory of Psychological Well-being?
Chapter 7. Conclusion
PART II. The Emergence of the Science of Food Animal Welfare Mandated by the Brambell Commission Report
Chapter 8. Introduction
Chapter 9. Rollin¿s Theory of Animal Welfare and its Ethical Implications
Chapter 10. Duncan and the Inclusion of Subjectivity
Chapter 11. Fraser on Animal Welfare, Science, and Ethics
Chapter 12. Appleby-Sandoe and the Human Welfare Model
Chapter 13. Nordenfelt and Nussbaum on Animal Welfare
Chapter 14. Conclusion
PART III. Giving Animal What We Owe Them
Chapter 15. Introduction to Part III
Chapter 16. The Fair Deal Argument
Chapter 17. A General Theory of Our Moral Obligations to Nonhuman Animals
Chapter 18. Conclusion
Index.