Over a longer period than I sometimes care to contemplate I have worked on possible-worlds semantics. The earliest work was in modal logic, to which I keep returning, but a sabbatical in 1970 took me to UCLA, there to discover the work of Richard Montague in applying possible-worlds semantics to natural lan­ guage. My own version of this appeared in Cresswell (1973) and was followed up in a number of articles, most of which were collected in Cresswell (1985b). A central problem for possible­ worlds semantics is how to accommodate propositional attitudes. This problem was addressed in Cresswell (1985a), and the three books mentioned so far represent a reasonably complete picture of my positive views on formal semantics. I have regarded the presentation of a positive view as more important than the criticism of alternatives, although the works referred to do contain many passages in which I have tried to defend my own views against those of others. But such criticism is important in that a crucial element in establishing the content of a theory is that we be able to evaluate it in relation to its com­ petitors. It is for that reason that I have collected in this volume a number of articles in which I attempt to defend the positive semantical picture I favour against objections and competing theories.

I Possible Worlds: Introduction.- 1 Possible Worlds.- 2 Semantic Competence.- 3 Semantics and Logic.- 4 Physical Theories and Possible Worlds.- II Situations and Attitudes: Introduction.- 5 The World Situation (It¿s a small world after all).- 6 Quotational Theories of Propositional Attitudes.- 7 More about Inscriptionalism.- III Quantification and Reference: Introduction.- 8 Identity and Intensional Objects.- 9 The Greek-Turkish Imbroglio (Do we need game-theoretical semantics?).- 10 Some Recent Theories of Anaphora.